| Combat Identification (CID) is the process of attaining | | | | location of the unknown entity to another element (e.g. |
| an accurate characterization of detected objects | | | | higher headquarters) to gain PID; by maneuvering to a |
| (friendly, enemy or neutral) throughout the Joint | | | | position of advantage until PID could be acquired; or by |
| battlespace to the extent that with high confidence, | | | | using the proposed DIDEA (Detect, Identify, Decide, |
| timely application of military options and weapons | | | | Engage, and Assess) Target Engagement Process |
| resources can occur. Combat Identification is | | | | (discussed later in this article). |
| achieved through proficient application of a family of | | | | In this highly publicized incident, very well trained |
| situational awareness and target identification | | | | Rangers were placed in a situation where they did not |
| capabilities, and adherence to doctrine, unit tactics, | | | | have the proper CID family of capabilities and in the |
| techniques and procedures (TTP), and approved rules | | | | heat of failed to correctly implement their training and |
| of engagement (ROE) that directly support a | | | | ROE procedures. The end result was a costly |
| combatant’s shoot/don’t shoot decision for | | | | decision that led to a fatal fratricide incident. |
| detected objects in their battlespace. The purpose of | | | | Better CID Capabilities The ability of a CTI |
| CID is to improve unit combat effectiveness while at | | | | technology to service multiple domains has gained |
| the same time preventing fratricide and minimizing | | | | importance since Operation Desert Storm (ODS). |
| collateral damage. CID is the process that human | | | | Fratricide studies have illustrated a 25% increase in |
| shooters or sensors go through to identify entities on | | | | “platform to soldier” incidents and an increase in |
| the battlefield prior to making shoot/don’t shoot | | | | “soldier to soldier” incidents by 10% during recent |
| decisions. To perform CID, the warfighter uses all | | | | Major Combat Operations in support of Operation Iraqi |
| available means at his disposal to sort the entities on | | | | Freedom (OIF.) The two CTI technologies recently |
| the battlefield prior to applying combat power or fires | | | | approved for acquisition strategy do not address or fill |
| effects. The whole point is to enable the warfighter | | | | this CID gap. BTID services only the “platform to |
| to maximize the effects of lethal fires against the | | | | platform” domain (M1, M2/M3, Stryker, and LRAS3) |
| enemy, while at the same time reducing or eliminating | | | | where as Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) |
| the effects of fires on friendly or neutral personnel, | | | | addresses the Ground to Ground and Air to Ground |
| equipment or facilities. While CID is a complex series of | | | | domains from an indirect and Close Air Support |
| linked systems, procedures and doctrine—when it is | | | | perspective. None of these technologies directly |
| effective, it is simple and transparent. When it is | | | | address the “platform to soldier” and “soldier |
| ineffective, its results can be tragic and disastrous. A | | | | to soldier” domains. Regardless of what CTI |
| recent example of the “links” in the CID chain | | | | technology is used, the combatant must still make the |
| (Family of Systems [“See” the entity] + Training | | | | final determination whether to engage the unknown |
| [“Identify” the entity] + Doctrine/TTP/ROE | | | | entity, based on blue, red or neutral status. Once |
| [“Engage” the entity]) being broken in the Global | | | | determined, the combatant must incorporate the ROE |
| War on Terrorism is the highly publicized Pat Tillman | | | | criteria and restrictions into his “shoot/don’t |
| incident. | | | | shoot” decision. Positive visual identification (PID) of |
| Fratricide in Afghanistan | | | | the entity to determine if it is a legitimate military target |
| While on patrol in a Taliban-infested sector of | | | | must also be ascertained. There does not exist a |
| Afghanistan’s Patktia province, an element of the | | | | technology that identifies friend or foe (IFF). CTI |
| 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, became bogged | | | | technologies only identify friend or unknown (IFU). A |
| down because of a broken HMMWV. The segment | | | | CTI technology should not be used as the sole criteria |
| of the platoon with Corporal Pat Tillman, Serial 1, | | | | for engagement due to its mechanical/electronic |
| passed through a canyon and was near its north rim. | | | | nature or due to enemy action (electronic |
| The other segment, Serial 2, changed route plans | | | | countermeasures [ECM]) that might render the CTI |
| because of poor road conditions that hindered the | | | | technology inoperative. In addition, partial fielding |
| recovery of a broken HMMWV being towed by a | | | | (either through design or system failure) of CTI |
| locally acquired vehicle. Serial 2 entered the same | | | | technology has been proven to increase fratricide, not |
| canyon from the south. Serial 2 did not have the ability | | | | decrease it, as crews rely on the technology as the |
| to communicate their situation and change of route to | | | | sole criteria to engage or not engage an unknown |
| Serial 1 due to the rugged terrain. Upon entering the | | | | entity. |
| canyon, Serial 2 came under mortar and small arms | | | | A Comprehensive Targeting Process Within the |
| fire from Afghan Taliban fighters. Rangers in Serial 1 | | | | Doctrine/TTP/ROE (“Shoot / Don’t Shoot”) |
| heard the initial explosion that preceded the attack. | | | | link of CID is the proposed targeting process known as |
| CPL Tillman and two other fire team leaders were | | | | Detect, Identify, Decide, Engage, and Assess (DIDEA). |
| ordered to head toward the attackers. The | | | | A review of current doctrine indicates there are |
| canyon’s walls prevented them from radioing their | | | | several engagement processes associated with |
| positions to their colleagues, just as Serial 2 had not | | | | targeting. Department of Defense Joint Publication |
| radioed its change in plans. CPL Tillman’s group | | | | 3-60 identifies a six step targeting process: |
| moved toward the north-south ridge to face the | | | | “Detect, Locate, Identify, Decide, Strike, and |
| canyon. The light was dimming. “It was like | | | | Assess.” US Army FM 3-09.12 describes a |
| twilight,” one Ranger in the fight recalled. “You | | | | generic four-step targeting process: “Detect, |
| couldn’t see colors, but you could see | | | | Decide, Deliver, and Assess.” A multi-service TTP |
| silhouettes.” Another Ranger felt the light was | | | | for time sensitive targeting called Find, Fix, Track, |
| “still pretty good.” A sergeant with Tillman on the | | | | Target, Engage, Assess was developed to support |
| ridge recalled he “could actually see the enemy | | | | the prosecution of targets in Operation Iraqi Freedom. |
| from the high northern ridge line. I could see their | | | | As was discovered in the 2004 Army-Marine Corps |
| muzzle flashes.” The presumed Taliban guerrillas | | | | Board Ground to Ground (AMCB G-G) study, the |
| were about half a mile away. Tillman took another | | | | problem with each of these processes is that CID and |
| Ranger and an Afghan ally down the slope “into a | | | | ROE application are implied tasks embedded within |
| position where he could engage the enemy,” the | | | | one of the performance steps. The “shoot/don’t |
| sergeant recalled. A Ranger nearby watched Tillman | | | | shoot” decision incorporating ROE is not formally |
| take cover. “I remember not liking his position; I had | | | | taught in professional military education |
| just seen a red tracer come up over us…which | | | | courses—leading to another break in the “links” |
| immediately struck me as being an M240 tracer…at | | | | of the CID chain. As an overarching target |
| that time the issue of friendly fire began turning over in | | | | engagement process, DIDEA would provide an |
| my mind.” As Serial 2 pulled alongside the ridge, the | | | | iterative, standardized and systematic approach |
| gunners poured an undisciplined barrage of hundreds | | | | supporting the application of specific CID and ROE |
| of rounds into the area Tillman and the other members | | | | performance steps for lethal targeting across the user |
| of Serial 1 had taken position. The first to die was the | | | | spectrum (from individual infantryman through indirect |
| Afghan, whom the Rangers in Serial 2 mistook for a | | | | fire controllers and beyond). DIDEA is generic enough |
| Taliban fighter. Under fire, Tillman and almost a dozen | | | | to be used as a systematic process for C2 node |
| others on the ridge “shouted, they waved their | | | | targeting planning as well as decision-making. Such a |
| arms, and they screamed some more.” Tillman | | | | process incorporated into doctrine would serve as a |
| then used a smoke grenade to mark their position and | | | | baseline for professional military education. The |
| firing ceased for a few moments. The Rangers in | | | | individual actions of the DIDEA process are |
| Serial 1 thought the engagement was over and got up | | | | summarized below. |
| from their position. The HMMWV then moved to a | | | | Detect – the acquisition and location of an object in |
| position of advantage and resumed firing, killing Tillman | | | | the battlespace. This first step in the Target |
| in the second engagement. To use this tragic example | | | | Engagement Process can entail the use of visual, |
| to better explain CID, you must first understand its | | | | RADAR, electronic signals measurement, or other |
| basic formula: Situational Awareness (SA) + Target | | | | means for detecting and locating objects in the |
| Identification (TI) = Combat Identification (CID.) | | | | battlespace. Identify – a systematic process |
| Combat Identification: The process of attaining an | | | | supporting the characterization of detected objects as |
| accurate characterization of detected objects (friendly, | | | | friend, enemy, or neutral. This is the primary step |
| enemy, neutral) in the Joint battlespace to the extent | | | | where specified CID tasks are accomplished. It |
| that with high confidence, timely application of military | | | | commences after an object is detected and located |
| options and weapons resources can occur (CID MA | | | | and provides a systematic process whereby the |
| ICD). Combat ID is achieved through proficient | | | | attributes of a detected object are systematically |
| application of a family of situational awareness and | | | | processed to support a friend, enemy, or neutral |
| target identification capabilities, and adherence to | | | | determination. Decide – determination of |
| doctrine, unit TTP, and approved ROE that directly | | | | appropriate application of military options and weapons |
| supports a combatant’s ”shoot/don’t | | | | resources on identified objects. This is the most |
| shoot” decision for detected objects in his/her | | | | generic step within the process and is the primary step |
| battlespace. | | | | where specified ROE application takes place. |
| Combat Effectiveness: (as related to Combat ID) the | | | | Specific sub-steps within the Decide phase will vary |
| ability of a friendly unit to rapidly and accurately sort | | | | depending on the weapon system/platform and |
| and characterize detected objects within the | | | | mission application. (Bursting radius of indirect fire |
| battlespace in order to allow for the timely application | | | | CAS delivered munitions as well as ground platform |
| of combat power and fires effects against an enemy | | | | surface danger areas must be taken into account in |
| force or target (to destroy, neutralize, suppress or | | | | this step due to proximity of friendly or neutral |
| disrupt), with the least risk of death, injury or damage | | | | entities). In some cases the decision may be made to |
| to friendly and neutral forces, entities, facilities and | | | | employ military options other than weapons systems |
| equipment ((prevention of fratricide and collateral | | | | (i.e. the repositioning of ISR assets for further |
| damage) definition by the TCM PBC/CID). | | | | monitoring of identified objects, etc). In those cases |
| Situational Awareness (SA): SA consists of reported | | | | where a weapons resource application is being |
| friendly (blue), enemy (red), neutral and unknown | | | | considered, this phase would primarily address the |
| entities normally displayed on a computer screen or | | | | following questions: 1) Can I engage (ROE |
| manually posted on a map. For the purposes of CID, | | | | application)? 2) If multiple targets, what to engage first |
| we will only describe SA as it relates to automated | | | | (Severity of threat, commander’s intent/high |
| and reported information using available C2/SA | | | | pay-off targets, high value targets.)? 3) What is the |
| systems. There are three key attributes of SA – | | | | best weapons system to engage with (Lethal |
| accuracy/timeliness of reporting; density of blue | | | | non-lethal, munitions effect, co-lateral damage |
| position, location, information (PLI) generating systems; | | | | assessment)? Engage – specific application of |
| and interoperability of friendly force C2/SA systems in | | | | military options/weapons resources. In this step the |
| the affected battlespace. SA is sent to and | | | | mechanical process of carrying out the decision made |
| displayed in two places—to the Common Operational | | | | in the previous step takes place. Assess – did the |
| Picture (COP) located in Command Posts for C2 | | | | applied weapons resources bring about the desired |
| purposes; and to individual vehicle/aircraft/soldier | | | | effect. In this step we assess the effects of the |
| platform C2/SA display devices for both C2 and | | | | engagement phase (battle damage assessment) |
| Combat ID purposes. The latter directly supports | | | | against desired outcomes. If the desired outcome |
| shoot/don’t shoot decision-making by human | | | | was not achieved, a decision to re-engage the target |
| shooters and sensors in close proximity to enemy | | | | could be made. |
| forces on the battlefield. | | | | DIDEA would serve as a Target Engagement |
| When CPL Tillman’s unit lost SA of where its | | | | Process requirement and support the insertion of |
| subordinate elements were in relation to each other, | | | | specified CID and ROE tasks into service training |
| the situation deteriorated: two friendly forces | | | | standards and programs of instruction. Individual |
| converged on one another without communications. | | | | platforms and mission applications would have specific |
| Several systems could have prevented this loss of | | | | sub-sets within the DIDEA process that would account |
| SA in Tillman’s Ranger element. A FBCB2 / Blue | | | | for the specific processes and mission applications of |
| Force Tracker (GPS-fed, vehicle-mounted or hand held | | | | that platform.vi] |
| C2/SA system) capability would have given all | | | | A Holistic CID Solution Progress has been made |
| elements involved a visual depiction of where mounted | | | | since the Tillman incident. Per the recommendation |
| and dismounted friendly forces were | | | | of the AMCB G-G CID Study, the Training, Doctrine |
| located—assuming, of course, that all vehicles and | | | | and Combat Development Division at Fort Knox, |
| dismounted elements involved were so equipped. | | | | Kentucky, assisted by the TRADOC Capability |
| Knowing where blue entities were in the battlespace in | | | | Manager Platform Battle Command/Combat |
| combination with the proper mix of target identification | | | | Identification (TCM PBC / CID) and the TRADOC |
| systems would of enabled vehicle’s commander to | | | | Centers, selected a vendor in March 2006 to address |
| properly guide their element’s crew-served | | | | issues associated with the incorporation of CID into |
| weapons gunners onto enemy targets—as well as | | | | Army doctrine. Comprehensive CID doctrine will be |
| to prevent them from engaging friendly forces. | | | | developed for inclusion into US Army FM 3.90, Tactics |
| Target Identification (TI): TI is the process of | | | | (publication date: 4 July 2001) that explains how to |
| determining the affiliation (blue, red, neutral) of detected | | | | increase combat effectiveness in relation to combat |
| objects at the point of engagement in one’s | | | | identification requirements, including but not limited to |
| immediate battlespace. This is normally conducted | | | | SA, TI, TTP and ROE. The CID input will address the |
| within line of sight visual range and is for the purpose | | | | Ground to Ground (“platform to platform,” |
| of applying combat power or fires effects against | | | | “platform to soldier,” “soldier to soldier,” |
| enemy entities or targets, while preventing fratricide | | | | “soldier to platform”), Air to Ground (rotary-wing |
| and minimizing collateral damage. There are two | | | | aircraft-platform to soldier and UAV-platform to |
| categories of TI – cooperative target identification | | | | soldier), and Ground to Air mission areas. |
| (CTI) and non-cooperative target identification | | | | Gunnery doctrine will be updated to incorporate |
| (NCTI). CTI includes any method or materiel solution | | | | Combat Identification requirements, to include but not |
| that allows a human shooter/sensor to “interrogate | | | | limited to, insertion of friendly, allied/coalition and neutral |
| or question” a potential target, and allows the same | | | | targets, and refinement of direct fire target |
| potential target to “respond or answer” the | | | | engagement processes. Existing gunnery manuals |
| interrogator in a timely manner. Air to Air and Ground | | | | for Armor/Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Air Defense, and |
| to Air systems use of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) | | | | Aviation will be reviewed to identify deficiencies in |
| Mode 4, and Ground to Ground systems, in the near | | | | addressing CID-related tasks. This doctrine shall be |
| future, may use Battlefield Target Identification Device | | | | for the entire Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), |
| (BTID) and Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI) | | | | including Armor, Infantry, mortar gunnery, Engineers, |
| CTI systems. Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) is a | | | | and CASCOM and should be used as a template for |
| misnomer as none of the CTI technologies identify Foe, | | | | the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and Stryker |
| they only Identify Friend or Unknown (IFU) entities. NCTI | | | | Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) manuals. The |
| involves methods or systems that exploit the physical | | | | doctrinal effort will take approximately 12 months to |
| characteristics of entities in the battlespace to help | | | | complete following initiation in March 2006. This effort |
| identify and determine affiliation, and does not require a | | | | will strengthen the Doctrine/TTP/ROE (“Engage or |
| cooperative response or answer from the target. | | | | Do Not Engage”) “link” of the SA + TI chain. |
| NCTI systems include optics (forward-looking infrared | | | | Improvements in the current family of systems |
| [FLIR], NVGs and binoculars), vehicle and personnel | | | | (FBCB2/JBC-P, Optics, 2/3 GENFLIR, JCIMS) enabling |
| markings (Joint Combat Identification Marking Systems | | | | the “sensor-to-shooter kill-chain” to better see |
| [JCIMS], which include Combat ID Panels [CIPs], | | | | the targeted entity can be enhanced through the |
| Thermal ID Panels [TIPs], Phoenix Beacons [infrared | | | | acquisition of a CTI that services all of the Ground to |
| lights lights] and Dismounted Combat Identification | | | | Ground domains and one that addresses the Air to |
| Marking System [DCIMS- (TIP panel that is form fitted | | | | Ground Mission Area, such as RBCI. Future CTI |
| to a Kevlar helmet, giving a reverse polarity image | | | | systems that enter into an acquisition strategy should |
| through a FLIR device), and Automated Target | | | | service as many domains as possible to fully address |
| Recognition (ATR) devices. JCIMS marking systems | | | | our CID gaps. |
| are used in conjunction with FLIR optics and Night | | | | Fratricide incidents are still occurring during stability |
| Vision Goggles and assist in friendly identification at the | | | | operations in Iraq and are being committed by |
| point of engagement. | | | | platforms other than armored. A system like BTID |
| In this example, Serial 2 (or the Platoon for that matter) | | | | would have no positive impact on these incidents. |
| did not have adequate optics. Thermal sights for | | | | Acquisition of a CTI technology that services all |
| HMMWV-mounted crew served weapons (AN | | | | domains will strengthen the family of systems |
| PAS-13s or Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG), | | | | (“See the entity”) link in the CID equation. Until |
| for example) combined with reverse-polarity markings | | | | that occurs and the doctrinal/facility gap mitigation |
| and/or thermal ballistic helmet covers on all soldiers | | | | measures are in place (identified and funded by the |
| would have enabled turret gunners to identify the | | | | AMCB G-G study), fratricides in full spectrum |
| dismounted Rangers in Serial 1 as friendly entities. | | | | operations will likely continue to occur. |
| Technology combined with a rehearsed TTP to avoid | | | | The fog of war and the human factor makes total |
| fratricide and adherence to ROE could have | | | | elimination of fratricide impossible. Marksmanship and |
| prevented this occurrence. Each “link” of the CID | | | | “muscle memory” (the ability to conduct crew |
| chain was broken. Tillman’s group would have | | | | drills/battle drills under stressful conditions, i.e. fire |
| benefited from other NCTI devices such as infrared | | | | commands, fire control systems switch manipulation) |
| (IR) beacons for limited visibility operations (seen | | | | training remains a “must” in order to maintain |
| through AN/PVS-7B/D or PVS-14 night vision goggles | | | | lethal crews and soldiers, and is necessary to |
| that every soldier currently is issued) or a day-visible | | | | simultaneously protect the force from fratricide. The |
| strobe light. A CTI technology that services Ground to | | | | contemporary operating environment drives the need |
| Ground domains (“platform to platform,” | | | | for a target discrimination skill-set for all soldiers, trained |
| “platform to soldier,” “soldier to soldier,” | | | | within the context of the DIDEA shoot / don’t |
| “soldier to platform”) would have been an | | | | shoot targeting process. This standard of training |
| additional tool at the point of engagement that would | | | | grounded in solid doctrinal principles will hone the |
| have enabled both serials to identify unknowns as | | | | warfighter’s judgment at the point of |
| friends. Unfortunately, the direct fire CTI technology | | | | engagement. Family of system and doctrinal |
| [Battlefield Target Identification Device BTID)] currently | | | | improvements coupled with improved training devices |
| being recommended for an acquisition strategy for | | | | (Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V), simulations, |
| the US Army and USMC services only one | | | | and realistic ranges with blue, red and neutral targetry |
| domain—“platform to platform”—and | | | | incorporating shoot/don’t shoot decision making) will |
| interrogates only targets from M1, M2/M3, and Stryker | | | | enable the soldier to make better decisions on whether |
| vehicles. | | | | or not to engage an unknown entity. The combatant |
| In the Tillman example, even if the HMMWVs are | | | | must be able to ask themselves the question if unsure |
| replaced by armored vehicles equipped with BTID, the | | | | whether to shoot or not: (1) Am I or my friends in |
| fratricide still could have still occurred—since BTID | | | | mortal danger? (2) What is the worse thing that can |
| does not work within the “platform to soldier” | | | | happen if I pull the trigger? (3) Am I positive that my |
| domain. This weakness in the CID “link” does | | | | target is hostile? |
| not enable the firer to gain positive identification (PID) | | | | There is no “silver bullet” solution to end all |
| of the unknown dismounted entity. In the example, | | | | fratricide incidents. The emphasis should be placed |
| Serial 2 in turn broke both the second (“Identify”) | | | | upon improving density of SA and TI systems in the |
| and third links (“Shoot/Don’t Shoot”): ROE | | | | Army inventory, preparing the combatant for full |
| was not satisfied by the gunners manning the crew | | | | spectrum operations and acquiring a CTI technology to |
| served weapons on the HMMWVs; and Positive | | | | service all domains in the Ground to Ground mission |
| Identification (PID) was not gained by the firing | | | | area. This can only be accomplished by looking at |
| element. In addition, a TTP (i.e. smoke grenade signal), | | | | CID through a holistic lens and by strengthening every |
| was not established or trained prior to the engagement | | | | link of the CID (SA+TI [Family of Systems + Training + |
| (or not comprehended during the engagement) as a | | | | Doctrine/TTP/ROE]) chain. It is imperative that we do |
| signal to cease fire in case of friendly fire situations. | | | | everything possible to prevent unfortunate incidents like |
| The Serial 2 firing platform could have used additional | | | | the Tillman fratricide from occurring in the future. |
| procedures to prevent the fratricide: transmitting the | | | | |